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The Foreign Aid Programs have created much controversy in the Con¬ 
gress of the U. S., and stirred public opinion. Each year the President 
of the U. S. request more foreign aid allocations from the Congress and 
the Congress finds many obstacles in the distribution of foreign aid to 
the underdeveloped countries. The Congress contends that the countries 
which receive foreign aid have poor planning, organization and account¬ 
ing. In spite of U. S. Congress's critical attitude towards foreign aid 
programs, many high ranking government officials and reputable econo¬ 
mists support the President's foreign aid program. 
According to Congressional reports, 82 percent of the world popula¬ 
tion lives in the 57 poorest nations whose per capita income varies 
within a few hundred dollars. Many countries in Latin America, Africa 
and the heavily populated countries of Asia have their annual income per 
capita less than $200. This amount, when compared with the United States 
per capita income easily illustrates the difference between the two sets 
of countries, the "haves" and the "have nots." Due to the low per capita 
income, saving rates are as low as five percent of the national income 
compared to that for the United States which is fifteen percent. As a 
result the capital is scarce in underdeveloped countries. Moreover 
productivity of cultivatable land in these countries is very poor. 
The education system also happens to be inefficient and the illit¬ 
eracy rate among the population is high. In these underdeveloped 
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countries, the only resource which is in abundant supply is labor and 
human beings, who multiply at fast rates due to the fact that mortality 
rates fell without a compensating decline in fertility. Thus, a large 
number of these people remain unemployed or underemployed. The process 
of a vicious circle makes the things even worse. The per capital income 
stays very low or, it goes down further so the saving rates remain low 
and capital formation does not take place and the swelling labor force 
remains unemployed. One of the very few ways to break out of this 
vicious circle is for the less developed countries to call upon more 
developed countries for financial help in the form of loans and/or 
grants. The foreign aid offering in this way can alleviate the shortage 
of capital for the underdeveloped countries. After all, we must say, 
and Dr. Ward argues that it is in the natural order of things for the 
underdeveloped countries to get financial assistance from the developed 
ones. But other reasons could be found as the determinant of foreign 
assistance. For instance, political and/or economic objectives always 
have played a significant part in the volume and the quality of the 
foreign aid. 
Perhaps the best way for us to examine the rationale for the exist¬ 
ence of foreign aid programs in this thesis is to review a few of the 
experts who wrote on this issue. Names such as Edward S. Mason, Milton 
Friedman, Hollis B. Chenery, Charles Wolf, Jr., Walt W. Rostow, and 
Thomas C. Shellins are quite well known in the literature of Foreign Aid 
and Economic Development. These people have been dealing with such 
problems as re-distribution of international income, the criteria for 
allocating aid, the instruments of disposing the foreign aid, the 
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potential impact upon the economy of the recipient countries, and many 
other problems. Thus, first of all we will examine the humanitarian im¬ 
pulses of a wealthy society towards a poor (in the economic sense) so¬ 
ciety. Mason in his work "United States Interests in Foreign Economic 
Assistance" cites this problem, but he essentially emphasizes the impor¬ 
tance of U. S. political and security interests versus the interests of 
the communist block. He says that most of the U. S. foreign aid is con¬ 
centrated around the periphery of the communist world. Another point 
that he makes is the fact that the Congress always approves the foreign 
aid bill in order to prevent the communists from taking over. Thus, 
Mason points out that the foreign aid has become another weapon in the 
East-West cold war along with other foreign policies. He proves his 
point so well that one wonders if foreign aid does have a humanitarian 
impulse after all. 
Two authors, namely, Milton Friedman and Charles Wolf, Jr. in their 
works have different points of view on this matter. On one hand, Milton 
Friedman approves in general the concept of foreign aid, but he believes 
that the free market system is preferable to government-to-govemment 
loans and grants which leads to a centralized economy. Friedman also 
argues that the government planners are not in a position to do all the 
detailed allocative decisions and for this reason the economic develop¬ 
ment of a country would be left into the hands of very few experts who 
will try to strengthen the developing country's public sector. Friedman 
goes further by saying that the private sector through the free market 
allocation system is more suitable. On the other hand Charles Wolf, Jr. 
says that only the government can be counted on. He assumes that the 
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government is an aggressive one which engages continuously in planning 
and allocating the funds in both the private and public sectors. Wolf 
also argues that only a strong government will be able to put both 
people and physical resources into one nation and one economic system 
and create the requisite economic and social overheads such as roads, 
schools and utilities without which growth of the private sector cannot 
get started. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF FOREIGN AID AS A FACTOR OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Edward S. Mason who has served in many commissions as advisor and 
as a member of many Presidential committees on foreign aid, has distin¬ 
guished the foreign economic aid in three parts: humanitarian, economic, 
and security.'*" It is important to know he says why a country wants to 
give economic aid to another country. It is also important for the 
countries who will receive the assistance to be able to judge the reasons 
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for which aid is to be given. Discussing first the humanitarian part, 
Mason refers to Gunner Myrdal, who once said that: 
In the societies of the west, a redistribution of in¬ 
come and equalization of opportunity has been taking place. 
So, the same implies to the integrated international so¬ 
ciety where a similar redistribution of wealth and income 
between the economically developed economies of the west 
and the so-called underdeveloped areas of the world....3 
From the above statement, he concludes that these changes came about in 
periods where democratic ideas, practices, and institutions prepared the 
ground for them, for example, the economic aid that the United States 
provided as of today to many underdeveloped nations. Although he suggests 
1 
Edward Mason, International Stability and Progress (Columbia Uni¬ 
versity, 1957), p. 63. 
2 
Ibid ., p. 64. 
3 
Gunnar tfyrdal, International Economy (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
New York, 1956), pp. 32-34. 
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that the size of the aid and the duration of it many times depends on 
the "strategic situation" of the receiving country than on anything else. 
He also refers to a report that the Commission on Foreign Economic 
Policy had made available to him. He quotes from the Commission's re¬ 
port the following: 
Underdeveloped areas are claiming a right to economic 
aid from the United States. The United States have never 
recognized such a right.... 
This statement, he says, is indeed correct because there has always 
existed an American unwillingness to recognize a moral urge toward an 
aid which will contribute to the economic development of underdeveloped 
areas. 
The second part that we will turn to now is the economic interest 
of the donor country toward the recipient country. Again he uses the 
United States as an example to establish the fact that only policies and 
institutions designed to the economic interest of the United States were 
approved. It became clear during the years that the Marshall Plan was 
developed in order to establish the world trade and international pay¬ 
ments favoring the United States situation. Raw materials, supplies, 
and the finding of export markets and investment outlets are the main 
factors to be considered in examining the economic interest of the donor 
country. It is also important for the recipient country to create these 
investment outlets, opportunities, and export markets that we mentioned 
above by having rising incomes which would be economically beneficial 
to the donor country. Mr. Mason again brings in the U. S. as an example. 
Since the second world war, the United States has imported 50 percent of 
the raw material output of the free world, from places where most of the 
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foreign aid has gone, such as Far East, Europe, Southern Asia, Western 
Hemisphere, and Middle East. It has been also argued that if the U. S. 
reduced its exports and its foreign aid programs, it could create a 
domestic unemployment problem. Therefore by creating export markets and 
investment outlets the ü. S. has tried to maintain a full employment 
level at home. Thus, exports, export markets and investment outlets are 
regarded to be sustainers of employment. 
The last part that has to be examined is the security aspect of 
the foreign aid. Again, Mr. Mason uses the U. S. as an example. He 
says that security interests have motivated the U. S. to spend and lend 
huge amounts of money and goods to different countries such as Turkey, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Foreign aid has also gone to Africa, 
Southern and Eastern Asia not to mention South America. The paradox is 
that most of these countries are in the neighborhood of the Soviet Union 
or its allies. Thus, the attention of the U. S. is to protect its own 
institutions at any expense and insure its defenses if it wants to exist 
in a world which continuously changes "under the impact of rapid popula¬ 
tion growth, developing nationalism and the application of western tech¬ 
nologies to unexploited resources." 
Thus, political and security interests have been for many years the 
discriminatory rule of how much and where the foreign aid will go among 
the underdeveloped areas. 
The United States has been unwilling to support a foreign assistance 
program which is not tied to a military formula. This unwillingness is 
one more proof to the understanding and to the assessment of the merits 
of the foreign aid to underdeveloped areas. If aid is to be given, it 
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must be given without strings attached to it, so that it is recognized 
as a purely economic foreign aid program.^- 
Edward S. Mason has made his points clear about foreign aid. He 
has explicitly stated that foreign aid is a part of foreign policy and 
military expenditure. This formulation should be changed. 
Milton Friedman, a widely recognized figure in the economic world 
as the leader of the "Chicago Schools" has to say quite a few things 
about the foreign aid. He said in his works that many nations as of 
o 
today have committed themselves to develop economically. So, they are 
prepared to go out and seek help from any one they can get in touch 
with. If they do not get it from the United States, certainly they will 
get it from the Soviet Union or Western Germany or any other country 
which is willing to offer assistance. This aid naturally will consist 
of capital or technical assistance which is available, many times, free 
of charge. He further says that the donor country must make clear its 
objectives towards which the aid should be directed and the means that 
are appropriated for the achievement of those objectives. In the case 
of the United States, he says, these objectives deal with a democratic 
framework in which free men can use their capacities, abilities and re¬ 
sources in a manner which will satisfy their democratic aspirations. 
Friedman also emphasized that assistance in the form of foreign aid 
Ï 
Edward Mason, International Stability and Progress (Columbia Uni¬ 
versity, 1967), pp. 64-71. 
2 
Milton Friedman, Uses and Objectives (Yale Review, Summer, 1958), 
p. 500. 
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must be concentrated on promoting worldwide economic development through 
means such as "strengthening of the free market domestic economies in 
the less-developed nations, the removal of obstacles to private inter¬ 
national trade, and the fostering of a climate favorable to private 
international investment. 
He also questioned the foreign aid on the grounds that such expen¬ 
ditures are unable to promote the economic development of other coun¬ 
tries. He said that at the end of the fiscal year 1957 the foreign aid 
expenditures in the United States were over the four billion dollars; 
out of this only half a billion dollars went for so-called "economic 
aid" which includes technical assistance. The rest went for "military 
aid," "defense support," and for other activities that are regarded as 
military or political subsidies. He sees a serious danger in this, that 
for years economic aid has been used as a label to permit actual mil¬ 
itary or political subsidies. Thus, he said, in order to judge govern¬ 
ment economic aid, we must raise two questions: first, whether the 
assistance really promote the economic development of the receiving coun¬ 
try and second, what political impact will the aid have upon these coun¬ 
tries as far as democracy and freedom is concerned? He points out that 
in most of these countries the foreign aid programs which consisted of 
grants, loans, personnel and material goods has been administered by the 
government of the recipient country for certain projects regarded as 
essential to economic development. Thus foreign aid has strengthened 
the local government and yet in many cases democracy and freedom has 
never been attained. Democracy and freedom have made some progress only 
in those countries in which the economic aid is channeled through the 
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private sector. Many authorities of foreign aid have recognized the 
fact that any assistance which is given to the public sector has an ad¬ 
verse political effect upon freedom and democracy. But economic progress 
is a prerequisite to freedom and democracy and economic aid may help the 
public sector i.e., the government to attain both of them. 
He also discussed the effects of foreign economic assistance on 
economic development. To this he advanced three propositions. 
The first proposition is that "the key to economic development is 
the availability of capital. He agreed that additional capital is essen¬ 
tial for development. But he disagreed with the way the capital is pro¬ 
vided to the recipient country. He said that most of the capital is in 
projects such as government owned or government subsidized international 
airlines. The cost of having such an airline is very much greater than 
the cost of buying the airservices elsewhere. There is hardly an under¬ 
developed country that does not now waste its resources on other potent 
symbols such as steel mills, etc. Thus, while foreign aid and grants 
add to the existing capital, they also increase the "amount of capital 
devoted to economically wasteful projects." 
The second proposition that he brings out is that "underdeveloped 
countries are too poor to provide the capital for themselves. Here 
again he says that this proposition is half truth. For many years India 
has accumulated precious metals. There was much saving, but it was an 
unproductive form of saving. In many low-income countries locally owned 
capital is invested abroad for many reasons such as political, and 
economic conditions. The owners of capital are afraid of a public or 
private seizure because the environment in general is not favorable to 
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private property and free enterprise. Thus, the foreign aid is likely 
to be a reduction in the amount of capital available from other sources 
both internally and from outside. Also, the government to government 
transfer of capital strengthens the government sector at the expense of 
the private sector, with an adverse effect upon the economic development. 
The third proposition is "that centralized and comprehensive 
economic planning and control by government is an essential prerequisite 
for economic development. To this opinion, he says that such programs 
could be a hindrance to economic development and grants. He does recog¬ 
nize the fact that in order for the assistance to be distributed, it re¬ 
quires a "development progress." The local government has an important 
role to play. A stable legal framework, law and order, security of the 
private property and protection of the individual, elementary education, 
roads, and a stable monetary system, these are the services that the 
government must provide in order for the economic development to take 
place. But none of these services call for a centralized program for 
economic development. He says that economic development is "a process 
of changing old ways of doing things, of venturing into the unknown. 
It requires a maximum of flexibility, of possibility for experimentation. 
Yet the essence of a centralized program of economic development is that 
it introduces rigidity and inflexibility." 
On the other hand, the advocator of private enterprise says that an 
underdeveloped country will have an advantage for letting private busi¬ 
nesses become part of the economic development. These private businesses 
risk their own funds and therefore have a stronger incentive to do well 
and succeed. There are bound to be mistakes and so, unsuccessful 
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ventures will be abandoned. But, when a government venture once estab¬ 
lished failed, it is seldom abandoned. The local government then will 
try to conceal the mistakes by subsidies or tariff protections or pro¬ 
hibition of competition, and these acts could be a hindrance to economic 
development. The central control would be a poor way to promote economic 
development. What is required in these underdeveloped countries accord¬ 
ing to Friedman "is an atmosphere of freedom, of maximum opportunity for 
individual,... .in short, a vigorous, free capitalistic market."^ 
In my opinion Charles Wolf, Jr. who has written extensively in the 
area of economic assistance and has served repeatedly as an advisor on 
aid-related matters with many governments, has put the whole problem of 
economic aid on a more distinct base. He says that "after all, economic 
2 
aid is nothing but another instrument of foreign policy." He feels 
that economic aid direct to the recipient government helps the private 
sector. The point he makes is that during the period of economic develop¬ 
ment, the government may try to increase its revenues for public projects 
and this could very well become so intense and compulsive that it would 
have no other choice but to help form the foreign assistance programs. 
Foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries in the form of community 
development projects or irrigations, or fertilizer distribution or river 
valley development can widen the market for private sectir output and 
increase the supply of inputs which are complementary to private 
Ï 
Ibid., pp. 501-516. 
2 
Charles Wolf, Jr., Economic Aid Recommendations (Yale Review, 
Summer, 1961), p. 518. 
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enterprise. Thus, these complementary inputs will act positive to pri¬ 
vate enterprise i.e., will raise the productivity of private owned agri¬ 
culture and industrial enterprise. 
Another very important point that Mr. Wolf brings to light is the 
"costs" always follow the economic aid. These costs are not the ones 
that we already know such as "hardness" or "softness" of interest and 
repayment terms but they are the "opportunity" and "alternative" costs. 
These costs are derived from the standpoint that the quantity of aid is 
not unlimited and that the "real" cost of using only limited resources 
for particular purpose is the returns that are foregone by not employing 
that resource in its best alternative use. These costs can be amounted 
to a great degree, even if the aid is given at little or no cost at all. 
Thus, we are coming to another point, that is to say, efficient use. 
Mr. Wolf is very much akin to these problems, because as a government 
consultant, has observed many inefficiencies and misuses in the foreign 
aid programs. He says that the only way to stop these dispensations is 
to strengthen the relationship between the aid donor and the aid re¬ 
cipient and also to make clear to the receipient government that future 
aid will depend on the efficient use of current aid. 
Wolf, who strongly advocated the need of foreign aid to all under¬ 
developed countries had added two more elements to his study. The first 
one is that the aid must be given directly to the government of the 
receipient country which in return will make it available to private 
enterprise. The other point is that for a poor country of today, it 
will be very difficult to start his economic development on his own. 
Thus, the self-financing of development in the less developed countries 
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would be more accute than it was during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century. For one reason, the relationship of income and natural re¬ 
sources to population is much tighter than it was two hundred years ago. 
Also technology has advanced to such a degree that the currently under¬ 
developed countries are able today to borrow and utilize technological 
possibilities. At the end, I must say a few words on what Wolf had to 
say about "government planning." According to Wolf there are reasons 
why government planning is necessary to administer the foreign aid. 
Foreign assistance he says are very closely connected to "external 
economics" and "decreasing costs." 
External economics relate to the social benefits produced by an 
activity which are not bringing any return to the investors. The 
examples include education and training, public utilities such as roads 
and dams and public health. Since these benefits are not "money makers" 
they obviously will be overlooked by the private investors as investment 
opportunities and thus, a need for compensating government investment 
will arise. On the other hand, decreasing costs relate to the lower 
cost of production per unit of output as the scale of economic activity 
increases (production increases). Thus, according to Wolf, under a 
regime of private enterprise, huge investment outlays will take place. 
These investments actually will result in "underinvestment" and so, 
government initiative will be needed to compensate for these deficien¬ 
cies; if the available resources are to have a maximum effect on the 
economic growth of that country.'*’ 
- 
Ibid.. pp. 519-531 
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Mr. Wolfe, again in his works has emphasized the need for active 
government planning because in most of the underdeveloped countries not 
only the market mechanism is imperfect and inflexible, but the labor and 
the capital are also inflexible, static and inefficient. He does recog¬ 
nize the fact that often planning by government can be rigid and in¬ 
flexible but the government planning can be improved and absolve the 
costs if any, more easily than the private enterprise. 
Hollis B. Chenery, who is Professor of Economics at Stanford Uni¬ 
versity and a leading authority in foreign assistance has tried to 
bring out the aid objectives. He has tried to clarify the different set 
of criteria for determining just how much aid should be given and 
whether the recipient country is eligible for assistance. 
In his works, Mr. Chenery emphasized that foreign aid is another 
tool of foreign policy and that the main objective of foreign assistance 
is to produce the economic environment in which the donor country can 
best pursue its own social goals.^ 
The second objective is internal stability of the recipients coun¬ 
try. This is sought by giving economic aid and financial support to 
existing governments in order to prevent internal disorders. The third 
objective of foreign aid is security of the donor country from external 
aggression. This is sought by giving military aid, securing military 
bases, and providing armaments. 
These three objectives are followed by the instrumentalities of 
foreign aid. The first instrument of foreign assistance is the 
1 
Hollis B. Chenery, Why Foreign Aid (New York, 1963), pp. 32-33. 
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development grants. Under this provision the donor country will bring 
a large amount of personnel to the recipient country for development 
purposes. Commodities and capital goods are also included in these pro¬ 
visions. But the main aim is the emphasis on education. Thus educating 
the masses of the recipient country is the first objective of foreign 
aid. 
The second instrument is the development loans. These loans are 
loans under easy terms and they must be repayed in the currency of the 
donor's country. The purpose of these loans is to increase the develop¬ 
ment rate of the recipient country. Under these provisions any type of 
resource can be transferred, but more likely the main components of this 
transfer will be capital goods such as machinery and equipment. 
The third instrument of foreign aid is "the supporting assistance." 
This aid which consists of various commodity or personnel will be given 
to the recipient country in order to prevent internal disorders. It 
will also help the recipient country to master internal economic and 
political stability. 
The fourth instrument of foreign aid is the military assistance. 
Under this provision the donor country will provide the recipient coun¬ 
try with military supplies, equipment, and training services. The ob¬ 
jective of this assistance is "external security," but in some countries 
has been used for internal stability 
The fifth instrument is the "foods for peace." Under this aid sur¬ 
plus agricultural commodities are available to the recipient country in 
vast quantities with or without provisions for repayments in any kind, 
monetary or otherwise. In giving away commodities, they are 
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philantropistic gestures. 
But, Hollis B. Chenery's most important work on the foreign assis¬ 
tance field is indeed the development of criteria for foreign aid. He 
says that the foreign aid of one country towards another must be allo¬ 
cated in such a way so to "insure the highest achievable per capital in¬ 
come growth." Thus, the aid must be given with one thing clear in mind 
to promote economic and social development. From an economic point of 
view the effectiveness of aid is divided into two parts. The first part 
is the productivity aspect which express the relation between aid and 
economic growth, and the second part is the valuation aspect which con¬ 
cerns the type of social change and economic growth that economic assis¬ 
tance will bring. 
In other words the productivity of aid from a given amount of assis 
tance over a given period of time is the element that we as economists 
must be concerned with. 
It is possible to evaluate, he says, the productivity of aid from 
which the recipient country will benefit, from elements such as economic 
structure and need for imported goods, skilled man-power income, total 
investment, efficient tax collection and mobilization of resources. 
The second criterion is to insure the narrowing of international 
per capital income differential. In general terms, the goal of assis¬ 
tance is to produce independent societies that will be able to self- 
sustain economically and politically. In the past years an income of at 
least $200 per capita seems to have been sufficient, but today a much 
larger amount of per capital income is needed in order to be able to 
close gaps of income differential. 
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He suggests, and this is the third criterion that the recipient 
country must guarantee, a "given annual percentage increase" in per 
capital income. He also observes that in order for this to happen the 
recipient country must be vigorous and aggressive in maintaining its 
economic "status quo" and preserving its economic stability. 
The fourth criterion is to permit the recipient country to get 
started on a vigorous domestic development effort. This is to suggest 
that the recipient country must improve ways and means of allocating the 
aid among its regions and it must be able to develop a long term develop¬ 
ment program. Also, the aid must be related to totals programs for re¬ 
source use and not be wasted for political reasons or other wise. Also, 
the efficiency of execution of the foreign aid program is important if 
the recipient country is to have economic growth and economic develop- 
1 
ment. 
In 1957, both Max F. Millikan and Walter W. Rostow published a book 
"A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy." In the book they 
indicated the criteria of eligibility for assistance. They emphasized 
that the distribution of foreign assistance among the underdeveloped 
countries should be decided by the absorptive capacity of the recipient 
2 
country rather than by politics. In other words, each underdeveloped 
country has a limited capacity to absorb the full amount of foreign aid. 
Thus, foreign assistance should be available only to the countries where 
Ï 
Ibid., pp. 33-45. 
2 
Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective 
Foreign Policy (MIT, 1957), p. 70. 
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capital will be productively used. They proposed four criteria on which 
the experts could determine whether a country is eligible for aid. 
The first has to do with the ability of the recipient country to 
carry out its plans with efficiency. It must have technical and admin¬ 
istrative capabilities to efficiently absorb the foreign assistance. 
The second criteria is that the economy of the recipient country 
must be developed in all sectors in order for the project to be fully 
productive. 
And the third is to have educational and training programs in order 
to make the most of its resources, it must also have a national develop¬ 
ment program which must be consistent with the requirements of world 
commerce and foster international trade. 
In connection with the first criteria, it must be understood that 
it is a kind that any lending organization would ask in order to provide 
the funds. Is there enough skilled labor? Is there adequately trained 
managers? If so, then the lending agencies will proceed with the lending 
of the funds and in many cases will be responsible for supplying tech¬ 
nical help. 
Very closely related to the first criteria is the second one which 
concerns itself with the distribution of the proposed product, that the 
lending organization have to concentrate on. If the market exists, then 
the lending institutions will be able to examine, if the necessary 
transportation and communication systems are available to bring products 
to the market. If again, deficiencies arise from implementing the pro¬ 
posed plan, the agency will come along to assist the recipient country 
in order to eliminate the deficiency. 
20 
The third criterion concerns the programs to be developed by the 
recipient country. The existence of such national development programs 
proves that the receiving country has faced foundamental choices about 
its development plans and that it has taken certain actions. So, the 
programs must keep in sight the various interrelated projects and rein¬ 
force them so that the people of the country would support the entire 
pattern of projects and be in consistent agreement with the goals of the 
society. It is also important to notice that through these projects, 
the national growth rate must use a certain level, and the resources of 
the country will be utilized to the maximum for its development so that 
the foreign exchange requirement could be at its minimum. 
The receiving country after all must take a choice to which sector 
of the national economy it should give the most of the foreign aid; 
choices such as agriculture versus industry and capital goods versus 
consumers goods prove that the national programs affects the values and 
goals of the people of the country. It must be made clear that the coun¬ 
try must be able to capture the maximum flow of savings from its own 
citizens and to be able to divert it into its development projects. We 
must also add that the financial mechanism and the tax structure must be 
able to function in such a way as to eliminate pockets of misplaced funds. 
Fiscal policy makers must keep in mind that inflationary development is 
not only unhealthy, but it would bring the destruction of the program. 
At the end, the program must progress in a manner which will be capable 
of integrating the economy of the receiving country into an expanding 
world economy. Often programming authorities, because of political or 
military developments, seek the security of some degree of authority. 
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In doing so, they imposed trade restrictions through money tariffs, and 
quotas, exchange controls, and protectionism. By doing so, the economic 
costs of attempted self-sufficiency in some industries would be high 
enough to destroy the programs for development due to the fact that many 
underdeveloped countries have small economies with inadequate markets to 
support industries that require large scale operations.*- 
The last author who will be examined in this part of the thesis is 
Thomas C. Shelling, a man in a responsible position with the government's 
foreign aid agency during the Marshall Plan days. In his book entitled 
"International Economics," he describes "the essential feature of most 
2 
foreign assistance is the capital inflow that it finances." He further 
emphasizes the fundamental economic process by which economic aid is 
transferred from the country giving the aid to the country receiving it. 
With the help of diagrams representing the method used in the Marshall 
Plan he illustrates the process of the financial plan and the flow of 
goods among two countries, the recipient and the donor. 
In the following diagrams we observe the money flows. In Table 1 
Part A (see Appendix) we see a simple flow between producers and con¬ 
sumers . The consumers exchange their local currency for goods from the 
producers and the producers in exchange offer their products. In Table 
1 Part B (see Appendix) there is a local currency flow from the con¬ 
suming sector of the country to importers, from importers to the banking 
- 
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Thomas C. Schelling, International Economics (New York, 1958), p. 
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authorities, from the banking authorities to the government and from the 
government to the producing sector of the economy. The other flow, is 
the flow of foreign assistance from the donor country to the government 
of the recipient country, to the foreign exchange agency or central bank 
of the recipient country to the importers of the same country to the 
exporters of the donor country. 
Thus, in Part B we already see how the foreign aid process is taking 
place. The recipient country receives the aid from the donor country. 
In the process it exchanges the aid for local currency through the 
banking system and in doing so enables the importers to buy from the 
donor's exporters. These import goods are bought by the domestic con¬ 
sumers who in return pay with local currency which in turn goes back to 
the government through the banking institution and it enables the govern¬ 
ment to purchase goods and services at the local level. The important 
thing to recognize here is the following: The goods that comes into the 
country from foreign aid have displaced some of the domestic products 
which in return become available to the local government, (see Table 2, 
Appendix). 
In this model we see how the capital flows into the recipient's 
economy as foreign assistance. But let us say that the donor government 
offers physical goods instead of money. Thus, the model will look some¬ 
thing like this: the diagram thats presented in (see Table 3, Appendix). 
In order to show the process of foreign aid in the form of goods, 
we put the banking system, the importers, and the government of the 
recipient country under one block by the name "government. " Thus, the 
diagram shows goods coming from the donor into the local government and 
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going on to consumers of the recipient country. In return the consumers 
pay back the government in local currency, with the government spending 
the local currency on domestic production.^ 
Thomas C. Schelling diagrams are very explicit, they facilitate our 
understanding of the foreign assistance as capital inflow. After all, 
essentially foreign aid is nothing but a transfer of resources from one 
country to another, and this, Schelling tries to show with the help of 
his diagrams. 
We have come to the end of the first part of this thesis. We have 
examined the different authors, who have written about the subject, and 
we must say that we have now a base to proceed to the third part which 
is concerned directly with the case of foreign aid to Greece 1944-1963. 
1 
Ibid., pp. 429-437. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE TO GREECE 
1944-1963 
Available official data show that the net national income in Greece 
was constantly increasing from about $180 per capita in 1955 to about 
$420 per capita in 1964.^ The rate of growth of the gross domestic 
product (G.D.P.) on the average over the 1948-64 period was 7.3 percent 
at constant prices, whereas during the eight years following 1964 the 
2 
rate of growth varied from 6.5 to 8.7 percent at constant prices. 
Therefore, industrial and agricultural productivity on the average in¬ 
creased at rates higher than the rates observed in developed western 
countries. Thus, industrial production during the years 1948-1964 in¬ 
creased by 9 percent. In the agriculture sector production increased by 
6.2 percent during 1948-1964. Two other sectors, namely construction 
3 
and services also did show an impressive high rate of productivity. In 
the financial sector as well, we find that the rate of growth was high 
after 1953. First, the stock of money increased at a rate of 18.6 per¬ 
cent. Second, since 1953, the liquidity of the banking system has grown 
very fast at an annual average rate of 29.2 percent. This rise in 
- 
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3 




liquidity, in the form of deposits other than demand deposits is one of 
the most interesting monetary phenomenon in Greece.*- After these high 
rates of growth, the economy realized a market slow down of private in¬ 
vestment. We may say that inflationary pressures created these monetary 
2 
phenomena which were not successfully arrested until 1967-1969. 
For the last years due to special credit and fiscal measures the 
rate of growth has started increasing again. Also, certain large projects 
with foreign participation have been under construction and ready to go 
3 
into the stream of economic production. 
During the period prior to 1947, the World War II and Civil War 
4 
destroyed most of the prewar real and financial resources of Greece. 
The production in agriculture and manufacturing was brought to a lower 
level. Also due to hyperinflation the economy through 1946 changed to a 
better one destroying all confidence in the currency. Communications 
were destroyed by 75 percent and 25 percent of the buildings were 
destroyed. 
At the end of the Civil War (1947) a third of the population was 
dependent on state aid. 850,000 inhabitants were removed from dev¬ 
astated villages and waiting for resettlement. These citizens were 
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dependent on state aid. Add all this, excluding losses in human capital, 
and you have an overall loss of capital stock amounting to 8.5 billion. 
So foreign economic, technical and military assistance started entering 
the country. At that period (1944-1947) prior to the Truman Doctrine 
the main body of aid was given through emergency programs and priority 
was given at the beginning mainly to foodstuffs and medicine supplies. 
These supplies were imported through the United Nations Relief and Re¬ 
habilitation Administration (UNRRA) immediately after Liberation Day 
(1944), and prevented the Greek population from actual starvation. 
These essential supplies and services amounted to $415.4 million of 
which $312 million was provided by the United States, and the rest by 
the other allies of Greece. Over the same period, Great Britain granted 
to Greece a total of $287.2 million of which $135.2 million was in the 
form of military aid for the elimination of communistic influence over 
Greece. The Export-Import Bank also extended in the form of economic 
aid another $14.6 million. A total of $717.2 million was given to Greece 
over the three year period with little or no emphasis on long-term develop¬ 
ment, but with emphasis on emergency repair works, machinery, equipment, 
and draft animals. The United States aid program to Greece started in 
1947 with President Truman's request from the Congress of U. S. to appro¬ 
priate a grant of $350 million to Greece, in the form of investments, 
foodstuffs (wheat, etc.) and military expenditures. However, guerilla 
warfare broke out during the last months of 1947, resulting in heavy 
emphasis on military programs. Therefore the aid programs were distrib¬ 
uted among economic and military uses without any clear ideas as to the 
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actual conditions persisting at the time. During the 1947-1954 period 
the foreign aid in Greece amounted to $2,144.1 millions (see Table 1, 
Appendix). The economic and technical assistance amounted up to $1,299.2 
million and it came from the U. S. in the form of economic aid, while 
$115.5 million came from Germany and Italy in the form of War Repara¬ 
tions, the rest $729.4 million used for military purposes. The main 
characteristic of the period 1947-1954 is that the annual assistance in¬ 
flows started declining rapidly in 1950-1951 from $400.9 millions to 
$268.6 millions in 1951-1952, to $214.4 millions in 1952-1953, to $124.7 
millions in 1953-1954, after 1952 the gross national product showed a 
2 
slight increase. Meanwhile, after 1952 the G.D.P. rose faster than 
before (see Table 4, Appendix). 
So, during the period 1947-1954 the foreign aid to Greece was used 
mainly for the purpose of economic development which included agriculture, 
food processing, power projects such as electricity and gas manufacturing, 
3 
housing, road building, and communications. In other words the foreign 
aid was distributed in such a way as to restore the production of food¬ 
stuffs and agricultural products. Also it was increasing the country's 
social overhead capacity such as communications, transportation, and 
electric power. It also financed imports of essential items such as 
1 
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capital goods and taw materials. 
Since 1954, the sources and types of foreign aid have changed con¬ 
siderably reflecting new economic and political developments. The United 
States Congress under the International Cooperation Administration Pro¬ 
grams did not authorize any more "development assistance" per ce for 
2 
Greece, but authorized only "Defence Support Aid." 
Similarly under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Acts PL 480 and PL 665 the U. S. spent between 1954-1963 $227.4 millions 
3 
and $76.9 millions respectively. Thus, a total of $501.3 millions was 
received in the form of basic foodstuffs, feed grains, bread grains and 
agricultural machinery (see Table 5, Appendix). 
Loans to the Greek government for economic development by the U. S. 
during the 1954-1963 period was $96.4 millions which directly contrib¬ 
uted to the investment programs of the Greek government. These loans 
were granted for a maturity of 40 years with interest rate set at four 
4 
percent. During the same period 1954-1963 the organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) assisted Greece with help from grants 
(see Table 6, Appendix). In 1962 the OECD granted to Greece $35 million 
to finance investment budgets, deficits, and meet balance of payments 
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difficulties.*" Also in 1962-1963 a loan of $14.2 million was given to 
finance the import of essential development commodities. West Germany 
also supplied Greece with long term capital loans, which made available 
to Greece between the years 1955-1963 $63.1 million for financing in¬ 
vestment in agriculture, power, communications, transportation, and 
mining. Similarly France agreed in 1960-1961 to make available a $26 
million loan for purchasing of commodities from France. Italy also 
agreed to grant to the Greek government a $6.3 million, 20 year loan to 
finance commodities imports from Italy. In 1962 Canada offered a $3 
million loan at six percent for 15 years to pay for capital goods im¬ 
ported from Canada. To all these should be added $22.2 million in 
2 
reparations paid to Greece since 1954. Thus, over the 1954-1963 period 
total development aid, including reparations amounted to $765.9 million 
as compared to $1,991.9 million received over the first reconstruction 
period 1947-1954 (see Table 7, Appendix). Military aid on the other 
hand amounted to $855.3 million over the second period 1954-1963 as com¬ 
pared to $864.6 million during the period 1947-1954. We can see clearly 
that Greece received an enormous amount of foreign aid, grants, loans, 
reparations totaling $4,477.9 million (see Table 4, Appendix). 
From 1944 until 1963 the military assistance was $1,719.9 million, 
almost 40 percent of the total amount of capital for development whereas 
the other 60 percent was in the form of reparations, loans, credits, 
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economic grants; and economic aid. A total of $2,758.0 million was the 
development aid and of that amount 4.8 percent represents the repara¬ 
tions, 7.6 percent the loans and services, 22.2 percent the economic 
grants and 66.4 percent the economic aid (see Table 8, Appendix). 
W. Ray Kandilis in his book '*The Economy of Greece" indicates that 
the large amount of foreign aid received by Greece had influenced the 
rate of economic growth over the entire period 1947-1963 in many ways. 
Foreign aid was mainly used to finance investment in social-overhead and 
public activities.*- Nevertheless, the volume and distribution of the 
foreign aid over the period 1947-1963 played a magnificent part as con¬ 
tributing factors to the economy of Greece. Over the entire period, in¬ 
vestments in infrastructure industries such as electric power, transport, 
and communications, absorbed 54 percent of the total foreign aid (see 
Figure 1, Appendix). These projects were capital-intensive sectors 
whose investment was a substantial contributor to the economic develop¬ 
ment. Investment in electric power production and distribution had a 
high priority during the 1953-1956 period and averaged about 31.4 percent 
of the total development aid (see Figure 2, Appendix). In the latter 
years this part of the economy continued to absorb large amounts of 
funds, 21.9 in 1957-1960 and 22.0 in 1961-1963. The overall average for 
the entire period was 21.3 percent or $587.4 million dollars. 
Transportation and communications had a cycle during the entire 
period. It started with a high 33.7 percent in 1947-1952, and it reached 
a low of 17.3 percent in 1953-1956, but it bounced right back to a high 
- 
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of 34.0 in 1954-1960 and 35.1 percent in 1961-1963. The overall average 
of foreign aid investment in the transportation and communication for 
the entire period was 32.0 percent or $88.56 million dollars. The agri¬ 
culture sector started with an investment of 17.9 percent in 1947-1952 
and finished with a high of 21.9 percent. For the entire period 1947- 
1963 the average was 18.9 percent or $521.26 million dollars. The aid 
given to the agriculture sector went primarily for flood protections and 
irrigations, for improved management marketing, and distribution facil¬ 
ities, and for land reclamations.^ 
Also, part of the foreign aid was allocated on the residential 
housing for workers and public employees. In 1947-1952 the average ex¬ 
penditure was 15.6 percent. After that it started to decline to a low 
of 2.9 which was reached between 1961-1963. The overall average for the 
entire period was 8.7 percent or $215.12 million. 
The allocation of foreign aid through Governmental Investment to 
2 
manufacturing and mining was very little. Over the entire period 1947- 
1963 only 5.5 percent was allocated namely $151.69 million dollars. The 
last two sectors, public administration and other activities had an 
allocation of 5.7 percent and 7.9 respectively. 
In short, the distribution of foreign aid through Governmental In¬ 
vestment assumes great significance because it shows very clearly the 
direction the government took, the priorities it had emphasized, and the 
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expectations the people had. It is quite clear from the above that most 
of the foreign aid went to reconstruction of the badly damaged economy 
of the country. The foreign aid played a part in building the basic in¬ 
frastructure industries. 
It is difficult to find statistical information indicating the 
ratio of capital inflows, i.e., "the ratio of foreign aid to gross 
domestic capital formations."*- Thus, I attempted to relate to the gross 
domestic product. This is, I understand, a very gross comparison, but 
nevertheless relating the foreign aid to the G.D.P. we can see with a 
very wide margin of error the association of large capital inflows with 
the growth rates of Greece. During the year 1951 (see Table 9, Appendix) 
the gross domestic product was substantially increased over the previous 
year 1950 by $150 million dollars. In this case the fact is clear that 
over the entire period and particularly from 1950 until 1961 the G.D.P. 
increased at an accelerated rate (see Figure 3, Appendix). The amount 
of G.D.P. for the 1961 period was more than double to that of 1950. 
Fortunately, Greece is not subkect to explosive growth in population. 
2 
The Greek population is relatively stable. During the last two 
decades of 1950 and of 1960 the annual growth in population averaged the 
slightly less than one percent and estimates put the current rate of in- 
3 
crease at about one-half of one percent a year. Thus, the distribution 
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of domestic product and the distribution of national income in Greece 
did not loose any effect due to the stable population.* In 1969 the 
2 
G.D.P. per capital had risen to $660 in millions of 1954 dollars. 
Turning now to the make-up of gross domestic product by sectors, we 
find that agriculture accounted for a large portion of the total G.D.P. 
According to the Ministry of Coordination during the entire period and 
particularly during the period 1950-1961, the percent of total G.D.P. to 
agriculture was 23.4 on the average. For the manufacturing accounts 
almost 19.4 percent on the average (see Table 10, Appendix). Construc¬ 
tion and housing accounts for 16.9 percent and trade accounts for 12.5 
percent. The Greek economy with the help of foreign aid registered cer- 
3 
tain rates of growth between the years 1947-1963. Measured in terms of 
G.D.P. in constant prices the average rate for a five year period was 
6.6 percent for 1948-1952, 6.8 percent for 1953-1956, 7.2 percent for 
1957-1956, and 8.7 percent for 1961-1963 (see Figure 3, Appendix). The 
rate of industrial growth on the other hand increased from 9.1 percent 
during 1947-1956 to 11.3 percent during 1957-1963. Agriculture growth 
also rose at a rate of 3.4 percent during 1947-1956 and 4.2 percent 
during 1957-1963. The transportation and communication sectors also 
grew from 9 .0 to a high of 13.0 percent for 1957-1963. Electricity, 
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water, gas, and housing registered an average rate of growth of about 
7.5 percent for the year 1947-1956 and 8.3 percent for the year 1957- 
1963 (see Figure 4, Appendix).*- 
1 
Ibid., pp. 251-259. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHENERY AND ADELMAN VIEWS 
In the study that Irma Adelman and Hollis B. Chenery have made about 
the relationship of foreign aid and economic development concerning 
Greece, it was stated that they chose Greece as a case due to the fact 
that Greece has received large amounts of assistance for a long period 
of time and that it has shown an accelerated growth of national income 
and steady development. Also, during the last few years, it has reduced 
its dependence on foreign aid as a means of economic development. Thus, 
the notion of an advance country to provide public grants and loans to a 
less developed country in the case of Greece has made it possible for 
Greece to have a substantial increase in the rate of growth. Also the 
response of Greece to foreign aid was such that it was able to carry out 
the required policies and plans. During the period covered by their 
study (1950-1961) Greece's dependence on external resources was reduced, 
whereas the rate of growth of six percent was stabilized. This record 
implies that the development policies was consistent with the transfer 
of external resources and other structural relations. But first let us 
examine the development policy that was followed during the foreign aid 
period.*" According to Adelman and Chenery: 
A transfer of external resources enables the recipient 
to raise the level of investment and to increase the supply 
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of commodities that are not domestically produced... 
To allocate a sufficient portion of the import of commod¬ 
ities needed to prevent bottlenecks in production... 
Once a growth process is established, changes in the 
economic structure in the direction of increased savings, 
import substitution, and increased exports are required in 
order to reduce the dependence on external resources. The 
development policies which were appropriate to the earlier 
period of maximizing growth with a large volume of foreign aid 
will then have to be modified in order to bring about the 
structural changes required... .1 
The above statement is very explicit. In the case of Greece her 
dependence on external assistance was very high. It amounted to 100 
percent of her gross investment. But over the period that this study 
had covered her dependence on external assistance was reduced to 50 per¬ 
cent of her gross investment, and that was the result of the policy 
objectives that were followed very closely by both the donor country and 
the recipient country. Irma Adelman and Hollis B. Chenery used an 
econometric model to show the different relations among the sectors of 
the economy and to investigate the effects of the external capital in¬ 
flow and to project the evaluation of the Greek economy under varying 
conditions. 
Under their study the period 1951-1961 was characterized by a 
strong effort to rebuild the capital stock. The rate of investment in 
this sector was much higher from that which was anticipated, due to the 
destruction of most residential and other construction during World War 
II and during the Civil War which followed. 
The elements of the model consists of four economic functions. The 
first one is consumption by households and government; the second one is 
1 
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private and public gross capital foundation; the third is imports of 
goods and services and the fourth one is exports of goods and services. 
The consumption function includes the consumption expenditures on 
food plus beverages and tobacco, consumption expenditures on clothing 
and other personal effects; consumption expenditures on rent, water, 
fuel, light, furniture, and household operations, and consumptions ex¬ 
penditure on services. 
The investment function consists of four parts: Part one is resi¬ 
dential construction for housing; part two is non-residential construc¬ 
tion such as plants; part three is machinery, and transport equipment, 
and part four is inventories. 
The import functions consist of four main components such as im¬ 
ports of foods, beverages, animal, and vegetable oil. Second, imports 
of crude material plus mineral fuels and chemicals. Third, imports of 
manufactured goods, and imports of machinery and transport equipment and 
fourth, imports of services. 
The export function also includes four parts: First, exports of 
food, beverages, tobacco, animals, and vegetable oils; second, exports 
of crude materials plus fuels and chemicals; third, exports of manufac¬ 
tured goods and machinery and transport equipment; and fourth, services 
exports. 
In the model also there are some statistical functions such as 
depreciation functions of the capital stock and two tax transfer func¬ 
tions such as direct taxes and transfer payments and indirect taxes 
minus subsidies. In the econometric model they included also two 
38 
equilibrium conditions. The first one shows that the difference between 
imports and exports of goods and services is the net foreign capital in¬ 
flow. The second one shows that the capital stock at any period is the 
sum of the capital stock at the end of the previous period plus the 
capital stock (net) during the period. 
The basic data that has been used in their study came from the U. N. 
Yearbook of National Account Statistics and the Yearbook of National 
Accounts of Greece. Also all values are in millions in drachmes (Greek 
currency) of 1954 prices. 
By solving a series of equations, both authors observe that the 
performance of the model was very satisfactory as the estimated values 
of the variables of the model and the actual values of the economy for 
the period of 1951-1961 were remarkably close. As we can see from the 
table where V is the gross national product, Ç is the total private con¬ 
sumptions expenditure, G is the government consumption expenditure, is 
the gross saving, I is the gross capital formation, X and H are the im¬ 
ports and exports of services, and finally, F is the net foreign capital 
inflow, the estimated and actual values of all the variables during the 
simple period correspond very closely to one another. Thus, the effects 
of the external capital inflow upon the economic growth of Greece for 
the period under study were greatly satisfactory. The external capital 
was able to sustain the six percent growth over the period 1951-1961. 
Also until 1957 the principal function of the aid was to make up the gap 
between savings and the required internal investment. Since then, they 
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found the aid has been used to make up the gap between the imports and 
the exports. 
If the foreign assistance had decreased during the study period 
they calculated that two things could have happened. First, the growth 
rate could have been reduced from six percent to two percent. Second, 
if it was desirable to sustain the existence rate growth of six percent 
then the internal saving rates would have had to be much higher than 
they were actually. Thus, these alternatives suggest that the produc¬ 
tivity of the aid was satisfactory to the point that the six percent 
growth rate was sustained over a period of time. 
The authors in this study pointed out that there must be some struc¬ 
tural change if Greece wanted to have self-sustaining growth. They say 
that it must reduce its dependence on external capital and it ought to 
increase the volume of her export. Also the composition of investment 
must be redirected into sectors that will earn or save foreign exchange. 
Aside from this, the domestic saving rate must increase to such a level 
if the country wants to have the six percent rate of growth. 
At the end of their study the authors have come to the following 
conclusions. They said that the Greek economy and specifically the 
G.N.P. consumption and capital formation in relation to external assis¬ 
tance achieved new and desirable high levels. Further, greater progress 
could have been achieved if changes had taken place in the economic 
structure of the country earlier and if the aid had been redirected to 
sectors that have a certain effect on economic growth rather than to 
sectors which inhibited growth.^" 
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CHAPTER V 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE AID AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE INTERNAL EVENTS AND FACTIONS 
Greece is a commercial rather than an agricultural country. Forty- 
nine percent of its population is engaged in agriculture. In other 
Southern European States the percentage of population engaged in agri¬ 
culture is 80 percent. In Greece only one fifth of the land is culti¬ 
vated. In 1972 only 36,500 square kilometers out of an area of 130,900 
square kilometers was cultivated. From ancient times the country has 
been unable to provide enough food for its people. This condition has 
forced the Greeks to imigrate and to engage in commerce. 
Greece was always dependent on foreign capital. As a result of 
this dependence Greece had to depend also on its exports in order to in¬ 
crease her capital.'*' But Greece's exports were commodities which were 
hardly necessary to support life. On the other hand her imports con¬ 
sisted of essential foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and raw materials. 
During the depression of the thirties Greece's exports were cut down 
substantially. This cut down weakened Greece's purchasing power. To 
remedy this situation an attempt was made by the government during 1920- 
1939 to expand the local industry. At the end of 1939, 400,000 workers 
were employed in local industries. During this period Greece had little 
or no fuel and its raw materials were at a minimum. The cost of 
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producing manufactured commodities for export were high; as a result 
Greece was forced to export agricultural products. In 1936 70 percent 
of the total value of Greece's export was accounted for by tobacco, wine, 
currants, grapes, and dried figs. 
Another aspect of Greece's economy, dating back to the nineteenth 
century was her merchant marine, considered the third largest in the 
Mediterranean and ninth in the world. This large fleet of Greek merchant 
marine can be attributed to the fact that most of the ships were old and 
were bought second hand, and their crews were chosen from the relatives 
of ship's captains, who were paid poorly, but received a share of the 
profits. A part of the earnings of men working in Greek merchant marine 
was sent to families in Greece. From this source Greece obtained $8 
million annually, as a net income. One other aspect of the Greek 
economy was the financial assistance of 420,000 Greek emigrants living 
in Euthopia, Argentina, Australia, Egypt, Union of South Africa and the 
United States. These Greek emigrants sent back hcxne money amounting to 
$25 million a year.*" 
During the period before 1939 the Greek economy had the heavy 
financial burden of providing for 1,250,000 refugee Greeks who fled from 
the Anatolian. Most of these refugees received land from the government. 
This land was provided through parcelling of big estates. Greece, also 
had to undertake a large program of construction - (homes, roads, hos¬ 
pitals, etc., etc.) - in order to accommodate and care for the refugee, 
whose number combined with the native Greeks brought the population of 
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Greece to 5,531,474. At the beginning the existing apparatus in in¬ 
dustry and in commerce could not assimilate this large influx of refugee 
population. This caused a great deal of human misery, and an increase 
of foreign debt; however, in the long run the Greek economy as a whole 
survived, and found its bearings. 
Most of these refugees were able artisans, and experienced merchants; 
and with their skills and know how gave a new impetus to Greek economy 
and commerce. 
A poor country from the beginning of her existence (1848) as a 
Nation State, Greece had to borrow the needed capital for her national 
enterprises. Most often the borrowed capital came from her neighbors. 
Thus, Greece's foreign debt increased from $360 million to $790 million 
in 1932. With the impact of the depression of 1930's her export de¬ 
clined from an average of $125 million in 1920 to $40 million in 1933. 
Decreased also were the amounts sent home by the immigrants. The huge 
sums of borrowed foreign capital were British and the terms on which 
this capital was borrowed, made Greece completely dependent politically, 
2 
economically, and in foreign affairs on Britain. To bring the balance 
of payments to a healthy, and desired equilibrium, the country had to 
default on its foreign debt, and look for new sources to borrow capital. 
Greece was able to import capital from Germany through agreements which 
made the country a German colony at a time when Europe was moving towards 
1 
Benjamin Ward, Greek Regional Development (New York, 1955), p. 66. 
2 
Stephen Rousseas, The Death of A Democracy (New York, 1967), p. 73. 
43 
a Second World War. During this time the economic conditions in Greece 
were below those existing in Western Europe. Life in Athens could com¬ 
pare favorably with life in the West. Yet in the countryside and the 
mountain districts life was difficult and primitive. Communications 
were very poor and the transportation problems were many. More likely 
one was to move around by foot or by mule rather than by an automobile. 
The people's diet consisted of black bread, goat's milk, fruit, olive 
oil, and very rarely eggs or meat. Thus, the nutrition of the Greek 
population was below the standard of the European population. During 
this period the hygienic needs of the Greek family was still poorly pro¬ 
vided. Soap and other commodities necessary for hygiene were not avail¬ 
able . 
Because of underdeveloped textile and clothing industries, house¬ 
wives were unable to buy the necessary clothing for their families. 
They were forced to make their clothing as well as their footwear at 
home. In the country the average farm was small. The land was poor for 
cultivation and could not produce pasture. The available water was 
limited and in regular intervals could not supply even the daily needs 
of the population. During this period, without an adequate market sys¬ 
tem, the barter system was accepted as the best possible way of trade. 
The population of Greece--in the country as well as in the cities—had 
an economy just above the subsistance level. 
During the last years of the 30's the Greek economy was dependent 
wholly upon the German economy. Although her economic conditions were 
1 
Ibid.. p. 74. 
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not fully satisfactory yet, progress was being made. A campaign of self- 
sufficiency in wheat growing was very well under way. The settlement 
and the assimilation program of the refugees were working with great 
success. The housing projects in Athens, and housing conditions in gen¬ 
eral were improved. Major projects, such as dams, power stations, new 
roads, and the beginnings of industrialization took place.* But the in¬ 
vasion of the Italian and German armies brought almost total destruction 
to this economic revitalization. The newly constructed economy was 
largely destroyed. Most of the villages were burned to the ground. 
About 25 percent of all buildings in Greece were destroyed or damaged, 
and again homeless refugees flooded the towns, especially Athens. In 
the country the livestocks and crops were looted, consumed for food, or 
just plain destroyed, together with industrial products and machinery. 
In addition half of the country's forests and olive trees were cut and 
burned. The cultivation of wheat, cotton, and tobacco had stopped for 
fear of requisitioning by the enemy. All roads, all of the country's 
ports and the merchant marine, and two thirds of motor vehicles (trucks, 
buses) were rendered useless. Industry came to a standstill due to the 
2 
lack of raw materials and transportation. 
As a result of all this, foreign trade came to a standstill. The 
volume of export fell from 1,000,000 metric tones in 1936 to 33,000 
3 
metric tones in 1944. The volume of imports also fell from 2,500,000 
- 
C. A. Munkman, American Aid to Greece (New York, 1958), p. 42. 
2 
Ibid.. pp. 43-44. 
3 
Bickham-Sweet-Scott, Greece, p. 45. 
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metric tones in 1936 to 250,000 metric tones in 1944. Currency also was 
a huge problem. The axis during the German occupation, as well as the 
allies later brought $2 million sovereigns into Greece; this destroyed 
all the confidence in the country's economy, and by the end of 1943 an 
inflationary economy got under way. The government began to print notes. 
The printing of notes got out of hand and was impossible to stop. Thus, 
the amount of currency (notes) in circulation was increased since 1939 
to 36,100 percent. The price for gold sovereign stood at 170,000,000,000, 
000 drachmas; this ridiculous figure made the drachma valueless. The 
only currency in circulation was the gold sovereign.'*' The health of the 
population has deteriorated. From N.N.R.A.'s reports we learned that at 
the end of the Axis occupation a third of the population was suffering 
2 
from malaria. Soon after the ending of the occupation Anglo-Greek 
financial and economic agreements were reestablished, and again British 
capital began to flow into the country. Technical and economic assistance 
was under way in the form of building and providing street cars and 
organizing electric power companies, etc. This time the Greek economy 
was tied to English capital. Great Britain imposed a permanent economic 
mission on Greece, and the issuance of currency was taken over by a 
joint Anglo-American mission. During this period there was corruption 
in the government, and increased inflation, a conflict between Greece 
and her northern neighbors (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania), combined 
with a growing leftist movement deteriorated the economic and political 
- 
Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
2 
"Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA," pp. 34-36. 
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life of the country. The government directed all its resources and 
energy to suppress the left. 
At the beginning of 1947 the British informed the United States of 
their intention to terminate all aid to Greece by March 31.^ With this 
action, Britain ended its more than hundred years of economic control on 
Greece. Sixteen days later, the United States took over the economy of 
Greece lock stock and barrel. Since 1947 all the major economic deci¬ 
sions in Greece were made by the Americans. From 1947 to 1951 the total 
of U. S. relief aid to Greece ran into $2 million. There was seme crit¬ 
icism about this American Relief Aid from many Greek political factions, 
2 
because half of the aid was for the military expenditures. A few hailed 
the American aid. They contended that America was a far richer country 
than England, and the American aid came just in time, just before the 
Greek economy was about to collapse. Some were conservative about the 
aid. They felt the country needed more moderation, and structural change 
3 
rather than hand-outs. Despite some of these diverse attitudes about 
American Aid, the U. S. was invited by the Greek government to send 
experts to administer the relief program, and to participate in working 
out policies connected with finance, trade, exchange control, civil 
service, and price and wage regulations. Experts were also assigned to 
1 
Smothers McNeill, Report on the Greeks (New York, 1945), pp. 220- 
222. 
2 
William Hardy McNeil, Greece: American Aid, pp. 23-32. 
3 
Ibid.. pp. 34-47. 
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1 
government ministries in advisory and supervisory positions. 
One of the critics of the foreign aid was a former Governor of The 
Bank of Greece, Varvaressos, who proposed rationing and price control as 
a means to stop inflation, balance the budget, and insure a more equitable 
distribution of the goods reaching the country from abroad in fair vol¬ 
umes. Varvaressos' proposed policies were to control and reduce infla¬ 
tion, regulate distribution and increase taxation. He proposed to im¬ 
pose a new and direct tax on industrialists, merchants and small shop 
keepers, based on the rent of their premises. He also proposed fixing 
the salaries of the civil servants and of dismissing those who had been 
2 
incompetent. In his report Professor Varvaressos stated that Greece 
could exist economically without financial assistance from abroad. 
Given only a moderate amount of American aid, mostly to meet abnormal 
cost of defence, the prospect of economic improvement and stability was 
not altogether hopeless; provided of course, the determination to carry 
out the necessary reforms was still alive. The reforms Varvaressos had 
in mind were: 1) prevention of tax evasion, 2) the overhauling of the 
civil service, 3) the proper control of imports, 4) the elimination of 
monopolistic practices, which had driven the price of locally manufactured 
goods to high prices, and 5) the creation of confidence in the monetary 
system (Drachma). To rebuild the economy of the country he proposed a 
five year plan in which the emphasis was on a program designed to improve 
industrialization, increase the standard of living of the poorer classes, 
- 
Ibid., p. 179. 
2 
Siz R. Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek (London, 1950), pp. 176-177. 
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and decrease the number of workers in agriculture. Varvaressos was 
very critical of the American Aid. He criticized the monopolistic prac¬ 
tices accompanying the American loans for the reconstruction of the 
Greek industries. Varvaressos indicated that only seven industries re¬ 
ceived loans from the American Aid. At that time, it was also well known 
that three firms in woolen industry controlled 60 percent of the total 
production; three firms engaged in the chemical industries controlled 
75 percent of the total output, and six cotton weaving firms controlled 
42 percent of the total production. Those firms with monopolistic prac¬ 
tices were granted the necessary funds through American Aid, while the 
2 
smaller industrial firms were overlooked. Professor Varvaressos pointed 
out that there were enough funds in the country to pay for the develop¬ 
ment program: first, the Italian and German reparations; second, the 
Sterling balances which could be used, the large assets held abroad by 
Greek citizens, and third, the sovereigns which were in circulation in 
the country. These he pointed out were the means by which the country 
could start to develop its economy without seeking foreign aid. The 
problem of balance could have been taken care of through the Economic 
Cooperation Administration allotments. But the use of the foregoing 
recommendations could be used as a means of economic recovery only with 
a politically strong government and Greece at that period did not have 
3 
such a government. 
Ï 
Kyriakos Varvaressos, Report of the Economic Problems of Greece 
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Since 1952 the economics policies of Greece had the full support of 
the American authorities. Long term plans had been discussed by economic 
planners, and grants for new projects were considered, and military aid 
was increased. For the first time the Greek government was directly in¬ 
volved in the financing of industrial development.^ The government also 
established a permanent planning board which consisted of government 
experts, political party members, and elected deputies. This board 
established a five year plan which was to be followed with another five 
year plan. The five year plan was not legally binding. It was just an 
indicative plan to be used as a guide. This plan only indicated what 
was desirable for the economy, but did not indicate the ways and means 
to accomplish it. The plan had seven goals which were only generalities. 
1. The increase of G.N.P. per head was desirable in order to 
reach the one of the developed countries. 
2. Redistribution of income among the social classes was 
desirable and necessary. 
3. The competition among the production sectors had to be re¬ 
inforced in order to eliminate non-politic practices. 
4. The increase of exports and a favorable balance of payments 
was desirable. 
5. The level of education, social security, health, and housing 
had to be improved and also the civil services and governmental 
Stephen Rouseas, The Death of Democracy, p. 96. 
1 
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offices needed reorganization. 
6. The regional development had to be directed towards an inte¬ 
grated growth of the less developed regions of the country, 
and 
7. Emphasis had to be placed upon the flow of foreign capital.'*' 
The various parts of the plan could be revised any time a new government 
came to power. Therefore, in one period we could see more emphasis 
placed on one sector of the economy, yet in another period the emphasis 
placed on another sector, as a new and different government came into 
power. The plan had seven sectors or segments: 1) Agriculture segment; 
2) Industrial segment; 3) Tourism segment; 4) Transportation segnent; 
5) Merchant Marine segment; 6) Commercial segment; 7) Energy segment 
2 
which included electricity, gas, etc. In the plan there was also spe¬ 
cific mention of the way the segments of sectors could be financed and 
utilized in order to attain the maximum of production and utilization of 
resources. Mention was also made of the employment and the distribution 
of the needed working forces in these sectors. 
During the era of foreign aid the agriculture sector produced less 
than a third of the products needed for the domestic needs. Yet it still 
employed 49 percent of the active working force. There was a need of 
land redistribution on a more equitable grounds, as 65 percent of Greek 
- 
Ministry of Coordination Plan of Economic Development of Greece 
(Edition, 1968), pp. 17-19. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 55-59, 110-112, 113. 
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farms were under 12% acres, and the rest had 500 and more. Most of the 
land with large acreage was owned by the Church, which had always re¬ 
sisted the redistribution of land. A large part of the 65 percent of 
land was not fertile, as a result the yield of the basic crops and 
animals were the lowest in Europe. Convinced that a substantial exten¬ 
sion of mechanization, irrigation, cultivation upon the mountain slopes, 
and the redistribution of the land would have increased productivity, 
the government at that period made some minor improvements in irrigation 
and mechanization. As a result productivity was increased from 2.8 
2 
million hectors to 3.7 million hectors. 
During the last 100 years only one major reform took place in 
Greece. The 1924 land reform was to break large Estates which were 
developed with the annexation of territories in 1882, and to give land 
3 
to a large number of tenant farmers who had just moved from Asia Minor. 
Since then, no land reform in Greece took place and this can be seen in 
the slow progress agriculture has made. Professor Higgins points out 
that: 
Large scale land ownership have abolished, but farm 
fragmentations still exists and it is an obstacle to Greek 
agriculture sector in all stages of the production process. 
1    
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Professor Zolotas in his book said that: 
Fragmentation hinders the systematic organizations of 
agricultural production and the application of intensive 
cultivation methods, the long distances between the land 
plots need a large amount of time and effort during the 
cultivation of the land and during the harvest periods. 
Some studies had shown that land consolidation could have increased 
not only the output, but the income of the farmers by some 100 percent 
to 200 percent. Therefore, land reform appeared to be needed at that 
time where the land plots could have been exploited to a much higher 
degree. 
Industrialization during the era of foreign aid increased. The in¬ 
dustrial production rate had settled down to an average yearly rate of 
2 
about 5 percent. Manufacturing production was still low at 26 percent, 
out of total production whereas the bulk of manufacturing production 
has been concentrated in a few light consumer goods. Twenty-seven per¬ 
cent of the industrial output were in textiles and clothing. 23.1 per¬ 
cent in foodstuffs, such as drinks and tobacco. In the production of 
building materials, paper, chemicals, 20.3 percent was registered, 15 
percent was in basic metallurgies, metals, machinery (electric appliances, 
etc.). The remaining 14.6 percent consisted of transports, non-metallic 
3 
minerals and others. So, we can see that the heavy industries such as 
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Zenophon Zolotas, Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development, 
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Data From the Greek Economic Life. Athens Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, No. 3, 1968, p. 16. 
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basic metallurgies, etc., were consisted of a very small percentage com¬ 
pared to the total industrial output, thus, the output of capital goods 
was negligible. 
In the case of Greece, the outstanding characteristics of manufac¬ 
turing industry were the predominance of small establishments with 94.5 
percent of the total firms employing 55 percent of the total manufac¬ 
turing working force, producing 33 percent. Whereas, the 5.5 percent of 
the industrial firms were employing 45 percent of the total manufacturing 
workers, produced 67 percent. 
Thus, we can recognize a kind of oligopolistic type of industries. 
The ownership was concentrated in the hands of single families, and 70 
percent of them had fewer than nine shareholders, the 30 percent had 
fewer than four shareholders.'*' 
During the era of foreign aid, capital, representing foreign con¬ 
fidence, was obviously a higher priority for the Greek industrialists. 
Therefore, the trend of foreign investment can be seen in the industrial 
sector of the Greek economy. It is fair to say that a large number of 
the manufacturing industries owned by foreign corporations have loaned 
their capital from abroad. Even today, in 1973, the present government 
still favors the importation of foreign capital: "confirming the confi¬ 
dence foreign business circles have shown in the economic development of 
Greece. 
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The Committee of Investments and Foreign Capital Protection of the 
Ministry of Coordination by virtue of Legislative Decree in 1968 approved 
the importation of foreign capital of a value of 229 million. Approvals 
for the importation of foreign capital in 1968 have been granted to over 
115 foreign firms. The total number of enterprises, which have obtained 
permits to establish offices in Greece in 1968 amount to 220, of which 
50 were industrial-commercial and 170 shipping firms.'*’ All of these 
firms are dealing primarily with "the development of the industrial sec¬ 
tor of Greece." With a cricical eye we can see that the results of all 
these activities, financial and commercial, are merely to extend the 
economic and social blight, which has characterized Greece's postwar 
dependence on U. S. investments in tourism, oil refining (Esso-Pappas) 
and Litton Industries. What is the purpose of this above discussion? I 
can briefly summarize as follows: In Greece, even today, the monopolistic 
and oligopolistic phases of industrial development are well recognized. 
These tendencies reduce the volume of aggregate investment, since these 
monopolistic and oligopolistic firms find it profitable to plow their 
profits back into their own enterprises. On the other hand, the amount 
of economic surplus in the form of interest, profits and rents, is being 
"automatically" absorbed through foreign economic relations. This re¬ 
moval of the economic surplus by foreign agents or its reinvestments 
abroad, has been the greatest evil as far as the industrial development 
in particular and the economic development in general is concerned. 
I'll give an example in today's figures and economic events which I may 
- 
Royal Greek Embassy Commercial Counselor, Monthly Economic Bulletin, 
No. 8, February, 1968, pp. 10-12. 
say is the brain child of the foreign aid concept: Litton industries 
has agreed to procure $840 million dollars in capital for Greece over a 
12 year period. In return the government agreed to repay Litton its 
cost plus 11 percent interest, plus a commission of about two percent on 
all capital that Litton succeeded in steering to Greece.^- But Litton is 
not interested in genuine development of the country. "Our primary 
2 
thrust is to develop tourism," they say. If tourism, therefore, were a 
sign of development, rather one of the chief syndromes of economic de¬ 
pendence and underdevelopment, then Greece itself would long ago have 
become an industrial nation. What Litton has in mind to develop or build 
are: 
Hotels, roads leading to hotels, airports where hotel 
guests can land, supplies of food and water, handicraft 
manufacture (for tourists trading posts), recreation facil¬ 
ities . 
According to one business magazine, naturally Litton's Stouffer's Divi¬ 
sion will supply the hotels. The Greek government also played a pre¬ 
dominant part in developing this trend of thought in general. Many times 
in the past it has been concluded and approved contracts for regional 
development or for construction, such as power plants with foreign cor¬ 
porations which were represented by individuals of Greek extraction, 
A 
such as, Onassis, Pappas, Niarchos and SkouZas. 
^Litton Industries, Proving Poverty Pays. "Ramparts," December 14, 
18, 1968, pp. 44-45. 
2Ibid., p. 43. 
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All these above - in a last analysis - do not meet the long term 
needs of the Greek economic development. A Greek economy, in general, 
depending on foreign capital and controlled by foreigners who fill man¬ 
agerial positions can contribute very little to the development of the 
economy. The opportunity of securing loans from abroad and therefore, 
being dependent on them, I must say, is a bad habit from which the 
economy must free itself. The important fact is that during the era of 
foreign aid, and even after that, the many governments of Greece had and 
still have to depend on foreign capital. 
The Greek economy during the years of foreign aid did experience a 
growth, but much remains to be said as far as the nature of aid, the aims 
for aid and the activity for which aid has been given. In principle, 
foreign aid, in the case of Greece, helped the country back on its own 
feet, after a devastating war, international as well as internal. It 
helped the infrastructure industries to be able to support the economy. 
It was also used to finance investments in social-overhead and public 
(social goods) such as housing. But in many instances, the internal 
government used foreign aid indiscriminately and without a program. The 
events of 1967 showed that foreign ais as a whole had failed to bring an 
economic stability in that country. 
History has shown more often that shared power has been more effec¬ 
tive than absolute power and that economic stability and a democratic 
form of government are more important in a developing economy. Foreign 
investment is one area that is highly sensitive to changes. Greece has 
repeatedly gone during the era of foreign aid, and after, through an 
economic instability in the form of inflation, gold hoarding, and 
57 
dislocation of aid and increasing interest rates. The old question 
between those that preferred agricultural development versus industrial 
development was very acute in Greece. Those who had administered the 
aid, might had looked at problems such as insufficient numbers of skilled 
workers, the mass production, the marketing method, the concentration of 
industry in the Athens area, and the apparent lack of development plans, 
and the price support policy for agricultural products. 
Many times, the policy makers adopted the wrong plans for the wrong 
cases and by doing so, brought more chaos and misfortunes to those areas 
where the foreign aid was predominant. 
At the end, we might say that foreign aid was the beginning and the 
primary force to open the Greek economy to foreign interests. What has 
been accomplished during these years is still to be seen. From an 
economic point of view, it is truth to say that the G.N.P. increased and 
the per capita income of the Greek people went up, but how about the 
corruption of the government and the development of a military regime? 
How about the inability of the people to develop their own talents and 
be dependent on a foreign power? These questions come to my mind, as I 
come close to the end of this paper. I am sure, that only time and new 
economic schemes and methods will develop to tangle with these problems. 
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1954 1955 1956 
Economic Aid 582 197.1 243.9 288.5 285.0 181.1 81.2 22.4 
Economic Grants 24.5 71.5 62.1 
Loans & Credits 14.2 
19.3 
Reparations 5.7 24.9 32.9 28.2 11.9 7.1 4.8 .2 
Total Develop¬ 
ment Aid 
582 197.1 249.6 313.4 317.9 209.3 93.1 29.5 29.3 85.7 
81.6 
Military Aid 135.2 189 .4 158.7 22.5 83.0 59.3 121.3 95.2 95.2 59.2 
95.6 
Grand Total 712.2 386.5 408.3 335.9 400.9 268.6 214.4 124.7 1 24.5 144.9 187.2 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Economic Aid 
Economic Grants 71.3 76.7 44.4 46.3 57.4 48.3 32.2 
Loans & Credits 27.9 24.8 21.9 35.1 35.3 17.5 13.0 
Reparations .4 .6 .9 .8 .9 13.6 
Total Develop¬ 
ment Aid 99.6 102.1 67.2 82.2 93.6 79 .4 45.2 
Military Aid 74.6 156.8 100.0 132.2 52.1 10.0 
Grand Total 174.2 258.9 167.2 214.4 145.7 89.4 45.2 
Sources: The Research Department of the Bank of Greece, and United States Embassy Athens. These 
figures were published in a study done by Diomedes D. Psilos, Director General of the 
Athens Stock Exchange and published by the Committee for Economic Development under the 
name "Postwar Economic Problems in Greece, pp. 36, 42. 
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TABLE 4 
THE G. D. P. 1950-1951 
Year 
* 
G. D. P. In Dollars 
•k 
G. D. P. In Drahmas 
1950 $1,426.3 42,790 
1951 1,594.0 47,819 
1952 1,578.6 47,358 
1953 1,810.5 54,315 
1954 1,956.3 58,690 
1955 2,110.6 63,318 
1956 2,258.4 67,753 
1957 2,463.8 73,914 
1958 2,545.0 76,914 
1959 2,645.5 79,366 
1960 2,769.2 83,076 
1961 3,088.5 92,656 
*In millions of 1954 dollars 
*$1.00 = 30 Drahmas 
Sources: The Review of Economies and Statistics Vol. XLVIII 
February, 1966, No. 1. These figures were published in an 
article under the title: "Foreign Id and Economic Develop¬ 
ment: The Case for Greece," by Adelman and Chenery. pp. 
1-19. 
TABLE 5 
INFLOWS OF CAPITAL ACCORDING TO ITS SOURCES 1954-63 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 Total 
U. S. A. 24.5 71.5 62.1 71.3 76.7 44.4 46.3 57.4 13.3 32.2 501.1 
OECD 35.0 35.0 
U. S. A. 10.2 9.0 15.5 12.5 10.2 10.6 15.8 10.6 94.4 
France 12.5 12.5 25.0 
Italy 6.0 6.0 
Canada 2.0 2.0 
W. Germany 4.0 10.3 12.4 12.3 11.7 12.6 1.0 .7 3.0 62.1 
OECD 4.2 10.0 14.2 
Source: The Research Department of the Bank of Greece Reports for 1966, 1967. Published in Athens 
and reprinted in the Economic Development issues, pp. 38-44, September, 1968. 
(Loans & Credits Economic Grants). 
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TABLE 6 
TOTAL INFLOWS OF CAPITAL 1944-1963 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
Amount Percent 
Economic Aid $1,881.2 66.4 
Economic Grants 534.7 22.2 
Loans & Credits 209.0 7.6 
Reparations 133.1 4.8 
Total Development Aid $2,758.0 101.0 
Military 1,719.9 40.0 
Grand Total $4,477.9 100.0 
X = Million Dollars 
Source: The preview sources were used with a small margin of 
errors, (see Table 1, 3). 
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TABLE 7 














Agriculture 17.9 11.0 19.0 21.9 18.9 $ 521.26* 
Manufacturing and Mining 2.0 4.5 3.8 8.2 5.5 151.69 
Electricity and Water 10.2 31.4 21.9 22.0 21.3 587 .45 
Transportation and 
Communication 33.7 17.3 34.0 35.1 32.0 882.56 
Housing 15.6 17.4 9.2 2.9 8.7 215.12 
Public Administration 11.8 10.0 4.2 2.8 5.7 159.46 
Other Activities 8.8 8.4 7.9 7.1 7.9 270.28 
*In Million Dollars 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 $2758.02 
Sources: The Ministry of Coordination National Accounts, Vol. 13, 
pp. 13-14, 1964. 
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TABLE 8 




Mining Manufacturing 19 .4 
Construction, Housing 16.9 
Electricity, gas, water 1.8 
Transport, Storage, communications 7.5 
Wholesale and retail trade 12.5 
Public Administration and Defense Services 6.0 
Services 10.7 
Banking, Insurance 1.8 
Total 100.0 
Sources: The Ministry of Coordination National Accounts Volume 13, 
p. 17, 1964. (see Table 5). Published in U. N., September, 
1968, p. 9. 
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TABLE 9 
THE GROWTH RATE 
1947-1956 1957-1963 
Agriculture 3.4 4.2 
Industrial Production, 
(Manufacturing Mining) 9.1 11.3 
Housing, Electricity, 
Gas, Water 7.5 8.3 
Transportation, Communications 9.0 13.0 
Public Administration 5.4 5.0 
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